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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, security incidents have become a familiar “nuisance,”
and they regularly lead to the exposure of private and sensitive data.
The root causes for such incidents are rarely complex attacks. In-
stead, theyare enabledby simplemisconfigurations, suchas authen-
tication not being required, or security updates not being installed.
For example, the leak of over 140 million Americans’ private data
from Equifax’s systems is among most severe misconfigurations in
recent history:Theunderlying vulnerabilitywas long known, and a
security patchhadbeen available formonths, butwasnever applied.
Ultimately,Equifaxblamedanemployee for forgetting toupdate the
affected system, highlighting his personal responsibility.
In this paper, we investigate the operators’ perspective on secu-
rity misconfigurations to approach the human component of this
class of security issues. We focus our analysis on system operators,
whohavenotreceivedsignificantattentionbyprior research.Hence,
we investigate their perspectivewith an inductive approach and ap-
ply a multi-step empirical methodology: (i) a qualitative study to
understand how to approach the target group andmeasure themis-
configuration phenomenon, and (ii) a quantitative survey rooted in
the qualitative data. We then provide the first analysis of system
operators’ perspective on securitymisconfigurations, andwe deter-
mine the factors that operators perceive as the root causes. Based
on our findings, we provide practical recommendations on how to
reduce security misconfigurations’ frequency and impact.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and pri-
vacy; Usability in security and privacy; • Social and professional
topics→ Employment issues;Computing occupations;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Security incidents and vulnerabilities in today’s Internet are often
believed to be caused by programming errors, such as faulty input
validation, race conditions, or buffer overflows, that are exploited
to disrupt services without the vulnerability being publicly known
and before a patch is available (0 days). However, when investigat-
ingrecentsecurity incidents, suchas thoseofEquifax[2,3],wefinda
different picture.Thevulnerability exploited in the primaryEquifax
incident, inwhichpersonally identifiable informationof 143million
customers were inadvertently disclosed and which sparked a con-
gressional inquiry, was clearly a programming mistake. However,
while a patch to address the bug was released months prior, it was
simply not yet deployed to the production environment.
Of course, not applying (security) patches can have its cause in
countless reasons, such as technical debt accumulated over time, or
availability and functionality requirements. Yet, when investigat-
ing the Equifax incident, such complex reasons are not the breach’s
cause. In the end, Equifax blamed the entire incident on a single
operator for forgetting to install security patches in time [4].
Broadening the scope, incidents that have their root cause in hu-
man error can be found all over the Internet, from basic infrastruc-
ture to applications [5, 6]. For example, in early 2015, over 40,000
MongoDBinstanceswerepubliclyaccessible fromthe Internet,with-
out authentication and authorization, and, in turn, allowed anyone
to retrieve the stored data [7], which might have been confiden-
tial or possibly would have even required governmental security
clearances. In fact, one of these MongoDB instances contained mil-
lions of voting records fromMexican citizens, and, in turn, it leaked
them online [8]. Other database systems, like Redis or memcached,
are not spared from similar human error: hundreds of thousands of
systems were discovered to be unprotected [6]. The configuration
of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for web application servers are
often similarly vulnerable to misconfigurations due to human er-
ror [9]. Ultimately, misconfigurations can also lead to other vulner-
abilities, such as servers becoming vulnerable to denial-of-service
attacks [10, 11], orwebsites turningmalicious [12] or being defaced
to embarrass the systems’ operators [13, 14].
Theoverarching aspect of these incidents is that themistake lead-
ing to the incident occurred during the operation of the affected sys-
tem instead of its development (as it is the case for software vulner-
abilities). These mistakes do not need to be complex, but they can
even be comparatively simple errors, such as missing or incorrect
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firewall rules, faulty or missing authentication, or software depen-
dencies, for which security updates were not installed. Following,
we use misconfiguration as the covering term for such (human) er-
rors in the operation of systems, and we use security misconfigura-
tion when such an error allows an attacker to impact the confiden-
tiality, integrity, or availability of a system (i.e., its security). The
corresponding actors are called operators (also called administra-
tors, or admins, sometimes prefixed with the type of system that
they operate, for example, network operator or system administra-
tor), and they are responsible for configuring systems to fit them to
an organization’s specific needs.
In this paper, we investigate the operators’ perspective on secu-
ritymisconfigurations. Specifically,we aim to answer the following
questions:
(1) Do security misconfigurations (regularly) occur in practice?
(2) If security misconfigurations occur commonly, what are the
reasons as to why they occur?
(3) Do security misconfigurations lead to security incidents?
(4) If security misconfigurations led to security incidents, were
the misconfigurations known and addressable?
(5) If security misconfigurations were known and could have
been addressed, what caused them not to be addressed?
To do so, we use a multi-step empirical approach, first approach-
ing the target group with a qualitative study to lay the foundation
for a subsequent quantitative evaluation.We investigate the subject
matter in an explorative, open-mindedway, to elicit a picture on op-
erators’ perceptions,withoutbeingbiasedbyseeminglyestablished
concepts and beliefswithin the research community. Hence,we con-
tribute the first empirical analysis from the operators’ perspective,
collecting a data set that can serve as the foundation and point for
comparison in future work.
Wemake the following major contributions:
 We present the first qualitative and quantitative study that
investigates operators’ perceptions of factors leading to se-
curity misconfigurations.
 Our results indicate that the majority of security misconfig-
urations have not (yet) led to security incidents, which sug-
gests that countless undiscovered issues may be present in
Internet-connected systems.
 We identify social (communication), structural, and, institu-
tional factors to bemajor facilitators for bad security posture
based on our analysis of the operators’ perspectives on mis-
configuration facilitators.
 We find that structural and procedural mitigations already
exist thatwouldpreventmostsecuritymisconfigurations that
our participants encountered, but that these procedures are
often not in place for various reasons.
 Weprovidepractical recommendationsonhowtoreduceand
the frequency and impact of security misconfigurations.
Outline. First, we describe our ethical considerations (Section 2).
Next, we detail the methodology of our qualitative approach (Sec-
tion 3), which is followed by our qualitative results (Section 4). We
then discuss the methodology of our quantitative study (Section 5)
and analyze the collected quantitative data (Section 6). Finally, we
compare to related work (Section 7), discuss the limitations of our
work (Section 8), and summarize our key findings (Section 9).
2 ETHICALCONSIDERATIONS
For the research of this paper,we conducted interviews and surveys
that involve human subjects, and we collected data about their ex-
perience. Furthermore, our subjects might be inclined to talk about
past behavior. As such, the nature of our research renders it inher-
ently challenging yet critically important to execute it ethically. At
the time the research was conducted none of the then relevant host
institutions had an Institutional Review Board (IRB) or a similar
committee advising on potential ethical issues. Hence, we indepen-
dently followed the guidelines set out by the Menlo Report by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security [15, 16].
Theparticipantsofboth studieswere informedabout thepurpose
of the studies and gave their consent to using the data for research
purposes. For the interviews, participants had the option to review
and redact the transcripts for confidential information before we
entered them into our research pipeline (including anonymization)
and theywere also allowed to opt out andwithdraw from our study
at any point. Particularly the option to redact and withdraw from
the study is crucial because pre-studies indicated that participants
may be overly cautious if these options are not provided, due to
being concerned about accidentally violating non-disclosure agree-
ments or private data.We did not question or deny any requests for
redaction, and we did not require any justification.
To preserve the anonymity of participants, we anonymized all
items that constitute Personally Identifiable Information (PII) prior
to analyzing the data. Furthermore, given that we are analyzing re-
sponses of individuals online, we consider their aliases/nicknames
as PII. Correspondingly, for our quantitative study, we collected
minimal PII in aggregated form only (e.g., a participant’s age was
collected in range bins), and we did not collect other PII at all, such
as gender, nationality, etc. Instead, we focused our survey on pro-
fessional information of the subjects, while ensuring that this infor-
mation cannot reveal the participants’ identities.
3 QUALITATIVEMETHODOLOGY
The literary body onmisconfigurations and their security impact is
still sparse, which is why we followed an inductive approach [17]
and used a qualitative study as a starting point for our quantitative
study. Following,wedetail our studydesign, recruitmentprocedure,
and target population.
3.1 Interview Study Design
To better assess the respondents’ perceptions and opinions on se-
curity misconfigurations, we opted for semi-structured interviews
with specific, yet open-ended questions. Our goal is to get a broader
overviewofsystemic influencesby lettingparticipantsdigresswhen
answering,whichmighthappenbecauseoperators tend tobeenthu-
siastic about their work (judging from our initial experience).
We started each interviewwith a brief introduction of ourselves,
the study, and its research goals. Furthermore, we encouraged par-
ticipants to provide technical and in-depth explanations of opera-
tions related topics. Subsequently, we engaged in three preset ques-
tions, which we selected based on the initial encounter:
(1) Whichsecurity-relatedmisconfigurationshaveyouen-
countered?
This question aims to investigate the types of misconfigura-
tions that can emerge during operations, and the systems
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that might be misconfigured easily or often. We also asked
how the interviewee discovered the mistakes, to understand
what reveals security misconfigurations. We then inquired
whether the security misconfigurations led to security inci-
dents, and how they think that the misconfigurations could
have been prevented.
(2) How do you thinkmisconfigurations occurred?
This question allows operators to conjecture on possible fac-
tors that facilitate misconfigurations. We did not restrict an-
swers to specific incidents, and also allow participants to in-
clude perceived factors.
(3) Howdidmisconfigurationsaffectyouandthewayyour
company approaches and handles security?
This question aims at understanding if the personal work at-
titude or habits have changed in response to a security mis-
configuration, or if there were sanctions or changes in con-
figuration procedure after an incident took place.
3.2 Data Analysis
To analyze the interviews, we collected anonymized Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) log files. In a first round, we analyze the anonymized in-
terviews with QDA Miner [18], and gradually generate categories
while keeping theunderlying codes rather specific to not generalize
themprematurely. Subsequently,we perform inductive coding [19–
24],which is commonlyused toconstructmodelsand theoriesbased
on qualitative data in social sciences and usable security [9, 25].
We then use Strauss and Corbin’s descriptive, axial coding [23]
and selective coding to group our data into categories and models.
Wefirst code, then iteratively refine our research questions,with an
emphasis on the different stages of coding.
We use one coder to construct the code book, which is deemed
acceptable in social sciences, especially when the analysis is inter-
pretative and exploratory [26]. An additional researcher, who had
not been involved in the data collection, then uses the codebook to
assess the frequency of codes in the interviews. We pay special at-
tention to cases in which the participants exhibit strong opinions,
whichappear tobe themostchallenging tasks, andhowtheyexplain
misconfiguration facilitators in conjunction with the underlying
root causes. Due to our community-driven approach (Section 3.3),
most interviewswere inGerman.These interviewsareanalyzedbya
German native speaker.We pay special attention to preservemean-
ing, tone, and, context when translating them into English. In the
case of English-speaking participants, we do not correct typograph-
ical or grammatical mistakes.
3.3 Operators as a Target Group
Operators are personnelwho are taskedwith configuring andmain-
taining complex systems. Therefore, they constitute an ideal start-
ing point for an investigation of multi-domain causes for security
misconfigurations. However, operators are, like developers [27], a
vocationally enclosed group, or as Halprin phrased it: “The average
system administrator’s day consists of so many complimentary and
contradictory tasks that they often find it difficult to describe to other
people what it is that they do.” [28]. Furthermore, they perform “[…]
such a wide variety of tasks each and every day, that it is often dif-
ficult to remember what they did before lunch.” [28]. Even though
Halprin’s observations stem from 1998, they remain valid today. In
general, operators tend to be highly restricted in their time commit-
ments [29].Therefore, any additional tasks, such as participating in
a research study, must be sufficiently incentivized. Unfortunately,
traditional recruitment methods, that is, monetary incentives, are
not applicable: Operators are generallywell compensated andmore
concerned about committing their time than receiving additional
pay [29]. Correspondingly, we did not compensate interviewees.
Additionally, typical recruitment strategies, such as (mass) mail-
ing campaigns, are also problematic: Operators are skeptical about
unsolicited mail, due to being regularly confronted with spam and
phishing at work [30]. Furthermore, there is no central database of
system operators’ contact addresses that could be used to launch a
campaign for recruitment, contrary to, for example, AndroidDevel-
opers [31]. Therefore, we opted for a community-driven approach
to contact the target population.
Recruitment. In the context of our study, the operators are do-
main experts. However, the topic of our study bears a primarily
negative connotation and operatorsmight be embarrassed to admit
misconfigurations. To address this problem, we aimed to create a
safe environment inwhich they felt comfortable to disclosemiscon-
figurations, also knowing that their data was treated confidentially.
During our initial engagement, several operators expressed that the
best place to recruit participants would be via IRC.
We used the channel of the German Network Operators Group
(DENOG) to recruit participants, which means that the operators
of our study are members of an online community. Note that, for a
lot of operators, IRC is usually running in the background (“idling”)
and used to share news and ask specific questions. Similarly, oper-
ators seek leisure time in IRC, discussing various topics with peo-
ple in their community. Therefore, in conjunction with earlier ob-
servations on time pressure and commitments, we framed our in-
terview about misconfigurations as a way to find leisure and to re-
lax. Overall, we conducted interviewswith 6 participants online via
IRC for our qualitative study, which did not reach theoretical satu-
ration [32]. However, the potential lack of saturation is alleviated
as our qualitative analysis is only used as a first step for our quanti-
tative study. Additionally, the target population is diverse with re-
spect to different (demographic) aspects, such as their relationship
to the organization ranging from freelancer consulting for compa-
nies of various sizes to administrators from non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGO) to medium to large organizations. Furthermore,
administrators are diverse with respect to their role within a team
(e.g., team lead, administrator, engineer, or consultant) and their ed-
ucation and previous work experience.
4 QUALITATIVE RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the results from our qualitative evalua-
tion. For eased readability, we use pseudonyms for all participants
instead of IDs. Following, we group the results of our qualitative
research steps into six major categories (Table 2), from which we
derive theories that we test through our subsequent quantitative
investigation.
4.1 Background and Demographics
Due to the nature of our target group and the focus on their per-
ceptions ofmisconfigurations, we did not request in-depth informa-
tion about the participants’ employers. Especially in the context of
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Pseudonym Background Language
Alex Former database administrator (DBA), now
DBA team lead, large organization, mostly
databases and Red Hat Linux
German
Benjamin Operator focusing on networking/systems,
organization size unclear
German
Christian Linux administrator with additional network-
ing tasks, medium-sized organization
German
David Consultant, freelancer, mixed setup as used
by the customers, not administrating himself
anymore
German
Eno Network operator, organization size unclear,
also active in an NGO
German
Konstantin Network engineer, large public healthcare
provider
English
Table 1: Interview partners and their backgrounds
Category Description
Misconfiguration
Types
The technical misconfiguration and resulting security flaw
Impact
of Security Incidents
Consequences for organizations, clients, and users
Misconfiguration
Facilitating Factors
Whymisconfigurations occurred
Impact on
Work Environment
How an incident impacted the work environment
Detection Circumstances leading to misconfiguration detection
Possible Mitigations Methods, tools, and processes that would have prevented
misconfigurations
Table 2: Coding-categories that emerged from interviews
Category Example
Authentication Faulty or missing identity verification
Passwords Bad or publicly known (e.g., default) passwords
Updates Missing or delayed (security-related) updates
Firewalls Disabled firewalls, faulty filter settings
Encryption Unencrypted login pages, bad SSL/TLS settings
Scripting Faulty automation stalling system components
Storage Backups on the same drive as the productive system
No hardening Not following best current practices, although it has no
direct security impact
Authorization Faulty assignment of access privileges
Deployment Publishing information like extended log files or version
information in connect banners
Integration Insufficiently separated systems (e.g., Internet and intranet),
not adapting old configuration to new systems
Table 3: Misconfiguration types of the qualitative study
interviews, where participants may digress around questions, spe-
cific inquiries might have influenced their openness. Nonetheless,
we include general information on their background, such as rel-
ative organization size or industry sector. We carefully examined
the operators’ statements about their general work environment to
ensure that the participants did not accidentally reveal identifying
information, and to redact such informationbeforeproceedingwith
the interviews. We also inquired about the operators’ background,
for example, which kind of systems they commonly operate. Our
participants have diverse backgrounds (Table 1), spanning smaller
and larger organizations as well as different aspects of operations,
including networks, systems, and, (database) applications. Interest-
ingly, as towhymisconfigurations occur, the participants described
their perceived issues in general, and regularly and explicitly noted
that their comments are independent of any specific organization.
4.2 Coding Categories
MisconfigurationTypes. This category contains the cases that the
operators considered a security misconfiguration. We categorize
theminelevensub-categories (Table3),whichare intentionally tech-
nical. Although including the nature of the misconfiguration (its
root cause) could yield interesting categories, such as the usage of
defaults due to being misled by conventions, or lack of updates due
to abandoned components (e.g., if the initially responsible person
left the organization), it ultimately leads to fuzzy results as miscon-
figurations often have several contributing causes. Hence, we de-
tach the technical mistake from its cause. This approach is more
suitable to identify both misconfiguration types and the involved
components.
Impact of Security Misconfigurations. During our study, intervie-
wees were mostly vague on the impact of security misconfigura-
tions. In many cases, the impact follows directly from the type of
misconfiguration, likewhen an operator does not configure authen-
tication, then unauthorized partieswill have access. However, if the
(potential) impact does not directly follow from the misconfigura-
tion itself, then it is oftennot clearwhether therehas beenanaccom-
panying incident. Furthermore, even if an incident occurs, then the
incident may still not be attributable to a singlemisconfiguration.
Misconfiguration Facilitators. Identifyingmisconfiguration facil-
itators is one of the objectives of our study. The interviewees’ per-
ceptions on potential causes yield a multitude of unique codes in
which the operators explain what keeps them and their peers from
configuring systems correctly and securely.We encouraged the par-
ticipants to cover all aspects of potential factors, which resulted in
several mutually dependent codes. In turn, a clear distinction and
separation between them is challenging. Based on our coding, we
systematically group codes relating tomisconfiguration facilitators
by the responsibility domains of the actors:
Systems
This category relates to the systems involved, for example,
complex setups, software with bad defaults, or, complex and
confusing interfaces.
Operators
This category includes personal shortcomings of the opera-
tors, such as overconfidence or insufficient knowledge.
Organizational Environment
This category relates to the operators’ organizational envi-
ronment, including management, or policy implementation.
Systems. Factors relating to the systems that the operators use
are predominantly usability issues, as Krombholz et al. also discov-
ered [9]. For instance, Alex remarks: “If you are setting up a new
system, you have to learn how it works first. But getting it working
is usually more important than figuring out which switches are there,
and which have to be flipped so the system is working and secure.”
The issues in this group have technical solutions: Pervasive usabil-
ity, better systemmanagement tools, and secure-by-default [33].
Operators. The operators are the main actors in systems’ opera-
tion, and we group factors together under the operators’ umbrella
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that relate to them personally. During our interviews, the most fre-
quentlymentioned issueson theoperators’ sidewas a lackof knowl-
edge, experience, or concern, but also simple blunders, or as David
put it: “typos happen.”
Focusingonknowledgeandexperience,Enostates thatmostnew
operators, just right out of school, are “[…] still wet behind their
ears regarding security.” Similarly, on the matter of misleading tu-
torials perpetuating insecure solutions, like chmod -Rv 0777 ./,
Christian mentions that “with enough experience you would never
do something like that. But it’s written on the Internet.” Interestingly,
Acar et al. [31] reported similar behavior among programmers.
On a self-reflective note, Konstantin reports why he misconfig-
ured a firewall, exposing countless internal hospital systems: “As
to why, well I was fairly right out of school, unexperienced, and my
education did not even prepare me for something so complex.”
Organizational Environment. In our classification, the organiza-
tional environment includes actions by the organizations’ manage-
ment team, as well as other institutional and policy-driven exter-
nal factors, like standards and regulations. Particularly important
is that personal and systemic factors can be amplified by the en-
vironment. For example, Konstantin continues his prior comment:
“I had very little training, our manager was the ‘figure it out yourself
type’. Which was common back then :)”
The participants also reported unreasonable budget constraints,
an unreflected faith in external suppliers, and consultants leading
to issues. David remarks onwhy automation and quality assurance
as remedies to typos and blunders are not implemented by a multi-
national network provider: “They use external consultants up to the
team-lead level.These cost 1/4 of an engineer inGermany.Why should
they care about implementing quality assurance or automation?”
Intervieweesoftentrace these issuesback tomanagementhaving
little to no understanding about what exactly the operators’ day-to-
day responsibilities look like. Such as when Konstantin and multi-
ple colleagues tried to communicate to theirmanager that a security
misconfiguration related issue in their network was in dire need to
be addressed, themanager “[…] then claimedwewhere just after buy-
ing fancy hardware, and overdoing [exaggerating] the severity of the
warned about issues.”Thismay tie inwithmore structural communi-
cation issues, or as David remarks: “From a manager’s point of view
all technicians are the same. Why? Because no matter to whom he
talks, he does not understand him.”
Factor Frequency. In our analysis, we find that external factors
appear more frequent than systems or personal factors. The most
common factors thatwe encounter are “unqualified leadership” and
“financial decisions.” Interestingly, insufficient knowledge and con-
cern are mentioned frequently, but other systemic reasons, such as
poor defaults or usability issues, are mentioned rarely.
Impact of Misconfigurations on Job Attitude. Over the course of
our interviews, we frequently encounter codes indicating that se-
curity misconfigurations lead to some positive change in job atti-
tude. Konstantin comments on actions taken after an incident: “We
adopted a clear naming standard for our firewall rules and interfaces
[…] The hospital in question started segmenting up there [their] net-
work.” Similarly, Benjamin remarks that “processes were adjusted”.
However, he also notes that “Timepressure is usually not fixed, be-
cause everything has to be fast.” Several interviewees report that
while actions were taken in response to an incident, they did not
include a general commitment to security, but they were incident-
driven remediation of the specific issues. More generally, the differ-
ing statements can be summarized by Christian’s remark: “Either
you are embarrassed by your mistake and learn from it, or you estab-
lishmore funny processes and buy useless security stuff. In large shops
it’s usually the latter.”
Detection. Looking at how misconfigurations are discovered in
practice, we identify three principal cases: (i) detection due to an
incident, (ii) accidental detection, and (iii) detection during an au-
dit. In our interviews, Christian reports an example of (i), namely
how he encountered a misconfigured system because it was unac-
counted for, security patches were not installed, and, in turn, it was
compromised: “Oryou’rewonderingwhythere still areworm-infested
Windows machines on your network and only then realize that the
print-server of $printing-system also uses windows. Of course not hav-
ing been updated for years.” In contrast, Benjamin explains how he
accidentally stumbled upon a misconfiguration, insufficiently pro-
tectedfile shares, by chance: “Chance is, if youare searching for some-
thing on a file share and suddenly stumble onto something that should
not be there.” He also reports that found misconfigurations during
security audits. However, based on the interviews, we cannot deter-
mine a clear distinction between audits as a method for detecting
misconfigurations versus them being a method to preventing them
in the first place.
Possible Mitigations. We identify four clusters from the mitiga-
tion strategy codes: (i) personal measures, (ii) non-personal mea-
sures including organizational strategies, (iii) postmortem strate-
gies, and (iv) social strategies. Generally, system operators are con-
fident that existing tools and procedures could mitigate security
misconfigurations if theywere used. Furthermore, a technique that
received particular attention across operators are “blameless post-
mortems”. Blameless postmortems are important and effective be-
cause, as Benjamin puts it, “[…] they are not about figuring out who’s
guilty, but instead about finding a sustainable solution for the prob-
lem.”
Personal Measures. The operators also commonly mention per-
sonal behavior and actions to reduce the occurrence of misconfig-
urations in the first place. On the more straight-forward side, they
suggest to be mindful about one’s tasks and to pay attention. Simi-
larly, having enough time to actually be mindful, planning well be-
foremakingchanges, andhavingaclearoverview andunderstanding
of the systemare aspects that operators see themselves to be respon-
sible for. To ensure some of these personal best practices, Eno aims
to make changes to systems he operates only between 8 AM and
2 PM. Furthermore, they frequentlymention that it is imperative to
have enough fundamental knowledge of the task at hand, as well as
sufficient experience in system operations.
Non-personal Measures. Foreshadowed by the perceived reasons
for security misconfigurations leaning toward non-personal issues,
operators alsohave strong tendencies towardprocessdrivenmitiga-
tions. For example, operators frequently mention that they require
processes that enable them to work without making mistakes. Sim-
ilarly, operators are concerned about the lack of understanding by
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theirmanagersonhowdiverse theknowledge in IT isandwhat tech-
nicians require in terms of environment, tools, and support towork
effectively and efficiently. In turn, they also perceive their job as be-
ing a translator between management and IT, and they indicate that
there should bemore IT professionals bridging the communication
gap between IT and management. This highlights the importance
of communication, particularly across departments, which is tightly
connected to the suggested social strategies.
Postmortem and Social Strategies. It is common practice to con-
duct a postmortem analysis after any incident, with the goal of iden-
tifyingwhatwentwrongandwhy.Theoperators inourstudystrongly
emphasize that apostmortemmust beblameless. In ablamelesspost-
mortem,personal responsibilityandaccountability isdetachedfrom
thewhat andwhy. Specifically, a blameless postmortemaims to pre-
vent operators fromomitting the truth to avoid punishment formis-
takes,which couldobscureor cover the actual underlying causes for
the incident, such as a lack of automation or poor procedures that
lead to security misconfigurations.
4.3 Summary
Overall, ourqualitative study revealsperceptionson themany inter-
dependent facets of security misconfigurations. Our interviewees
have a broad range of experiences with security misconfigurations.
Based on our interviews, security misconfigurations appear to be a
commonproblem in theoperations community.Although technical
mitigation strategies exist, operators still perceivemitigation strate-
gies as rarely or insufficiently implemented and they see the princi-
pal reasons for misconfigurations in the institutional and manage-
ment domain.Theoperators alsohighlight that thediscoveryof a se-
curity misconfiguration or an incident due to a misconfiguration it-
self oftenhasapositiveeffectonacompany’s securityposture.How-
ever, this positive effect can only be temporary. Based on these ob-
servations,we focus our quantitative analysis on three core themes:
(1) Securitymisconfigurationsaremorecommonthanthe
reported security incidents indicate.
Securitymisconfigurations do not always lead to large-scale
security incidents. Hence, they may not have been publicly
disclosed. Based on our qualitative research, we assume that
misconfigurations are a regular occurrence and every opera-
tor has encountered them previously.
(2) Securitymisconfigurationfacilitatorsarelargelybased
in themanagement and institutional domain.
Most discussed misconfiguration facilitators pertain to deci-
sions bymanagementor institutional characteristics, suchas
insufficiently allotted time to complete tasks, underspecified,
missing, or overly restrictive processes, as well as unreason-
ablebudgetconstraints.Theseconditionsappear tobecaused
by a lack of understanding or trust toward the operators.
(3) Securitymisconfigurations that result in security inci-
dentsmakemanagementandoperations (temporarily)
more security-sensitive.
Several interviewees stated thatdiscoveringsecuritymiscon-
figurations made them more cautious. Furthermore, as inci-
dents also involve management, the negative impact of mis-
configurations (eventually) will makemanagementmore ap-
preciativeof securityand incidentprevention,which, in turn,
increases theirwillingness to invest in the securitymeasures
that prevent or reduce the impact of misconfigurations. Im-
portantly, it only increases their willingness if we expect the
cost of an incident to be higher than its preventivemeasures,
which has become a reasonable assumption today due to the
theft and value of private data, and governmental fines [34].
5 QUANTITATIVEMETHODOLOGY
To investigate the observations from the qualitative study, we con-
ducted a broader quantitative study.We implemented our question-
naire using Google Forms [35].
5.1 Questionnaire Structure and Sections
We specifically design our questionnaire so that it allows investi-
gating the previously stated observations.1 To address multiple cat-
egories of subjects gracefully, there are multiple paths through our
questionnaire, primarily based on the subjects’ current state of em-
ployment (Figure 1). See the full questionnaire in Appendix A.
At the start of our questionnaire, we inform participants about
the purpose of our study, andwe explain the applicable privacy con-
siderations.Wealso inform theparticipants that completing the sur-
vey will take between 10 and 20 minutes, depending on how many
of the qualitative questions they will answer. Participants were not
compensated for participating in our survey.
Throughout our survey andwherever an estimationwithin a cer-
tain rangewas needed,we use unipolar and bipolar five-step Likert-
typescaleswithbalancedoptions thatwouldbeperceivedasequally
far apart from each other [36].
We focus our survey on: Occupation, Job Environment, Daily
Business, Past Misconfiguration Experience, Misconfiguration Facili-
tating Factors, Consequences, Opinions, and Demographics.
Occupation. Operators may work in different organizational se-
tups and constellations. In fact, during our qualitative study, some
operators were working as independent consultants, other opera-
tors were employed by a company, and others again have left the
profession, but remain involved in the operations community and
still have important insights to share. To address these three groups
correctly in wording and to classify their responses appropriately,
ourquestionnaire isdivided in threebranches (Figure1).Eachbranch
uses the same structure and types of questions, but the wording is
adjusted to fit the operator’s employment situation (e.g., a consul-
tant has customers, while an employed operator has managers).
Job Environment. We also investigate the institutional environ-
ment that the operators work in. This includes the operators’ job
titles, whether it matches what they are actually doing, and, if they
perceive themselves as operators. Participants that did not consider
themselves as operators are led to an exit page, and we thank them
for their participation. We also ask about the organizations’ size or
industry for an in-depth analysis of the prevalence ofmisconfigura-
tions in future work.
Daily Business. The next part of our survey deals with what our
respondents do on a day-to-day basis, for example, what kind of IT
systems they operate and how they would estimate their expertise
in the respective fields. Furthermore, to assess working experience,
we also record how long they have been operators.
1Thequestionnaire covers additional topics that arebeyond the scopeof thispaper.
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1. Introduction
Employed Self- Former
2. Employment State
3. The Operators' Environment
10. Demographics
11. Exit-Form
4. The Operators' Tasks
5. Severity ratings
6. Experiences with MKs/Incidents
7. Encountered MK Factors
8. Impact of security MKs/incidents
9. Opinions on var. statements
A. Looking Back
B. Exit Questionnaire
E-Mail Form
Former
Present Present
Former
No
No No No
YesSelf-Employed
Out of work
Employed
Employed Operators
- Ask operators to answer
  based on their experiences
- Collect e-mail addresses to update
  participants on the survey's results
- Participant consent form
- Information about the
  Survey
- Business type
- Work environment
- Test for non-operators
Figure 1:Questionnaire overview
Past Misconfiguration Experience. This section of our question-
naire is dedicated to security misconfigurations and experiences
that operators have with them. To collect comparable and correct
data, we define and describe what security and security misconfig-
urations are in the context of the questionnaire. The questions of
this section serve to address our observation that security miscon-
figurations appear to be a common issue in IT operations. Hence,
we record whether operators had misconfigured something before
that was security-relevant, andwhether there had been an incident
because of it. Furthermore, based on our observations on the impor-
tance of blameless postmortems,we also ask if theyhad encountered
a security misconfiguration made by someone else.
To better understand the frequency of different types of miscon-
figurations, and to compare to the respondents’ self-reflections in
the first part of this section, we also inquire whether the operators
have encountered a specific misconfiguration or had misconfigured
a specific system themselves using examples of misconfigurations
from our qualitative study (Table 3). To supplement our qualitative
data onhowmisconfigurations are detected in practice,we also pro-
vide an optional free-text field.
Misconfiguration Facilitating Factors. In this part of the survey,
we ask operators to indicate how regularly they encountered the
personal, environmental and system-specificmisconfiguration facili-
tating factors that we identified in our qualitative study (Section 4).
Again, we provide a free-text field to collect additional qualitative
data.
Consequences. Investigating consequences of a security miscon-
figuration incident relates to the reoccurring theme that incidents
supposedly change a company’s security posture. Hence, we in-
quire whether the discovery of security misconfigurations resulted
in a perceived change in security posture, and whether the opera-
tors perceived possible changes as for the better or for the worse.
Concerning the influence of a security incident, participants com-
pare the impact of actual security incidents to themere discovery of
misconfigurations. For both questions, they are free to pick I don’t
know if they have no experience or opinion on the matter.
Opinions. The lastmisconfiguration-related part of our question-
naireaddresses theoperators’opinionsonstatements fromourqual-
itative interviews.Questions include, for example, whether the op-
erators felt they were taught how to deal with broken systems over
the course of their education, andwhether they think that toomany
optionsareconfigurablenowadays (“toomanyknobs”).Table4 (Sec-
tion 6) provides an overview of the statements that we analyze. Fur-
thermore, we inquire which systems they find particularly hard to
operate and why (in a free-text field), as they may point at particu-
larly hard-to-use or unpopular systems that researchers should in-
vestigate more closely.
Demographics. To allow comparison of our data with other stud-
ies, such as the USENIX LISA salary survey among operators [29],
we collect demographic data on the participants.This includes their
work location, age range, and level of education.
5.2 Dissemination
To increase participation in our study,we established a brand in our
dissemination channels to utilize a recognition effect that spans all
dissemination channels. We also used this brand in our survey, so
that participants recognized our survey throughout different dis-
semination channels [37]. Establishing a recognizable brand was
particularly crucial to recruit system operators, who are more diffi-
cult to recruit through traditionalmechanisms (e.g.,monetarily, due
to generally higher compensation) and more time constrained (i.e.,
they might not participate the first time they encounter the study),
because information and reminders about the studyweremore eas-
ily and immediately recognizable. We did this through comics in a
distinctive drawing style (e.g., Figure 2). Our drawings also proved
useful for illustrating concepts, clarifying definitions, and what we
were asking for in the questionnaire. Furthermore, while we did
not compensate participants, we provided them the opportunity to
be informed about any updates on our research project. To ensure
anonymity of survey responses, we collected the email addresses
through a separate form,whichwas fully separated from the survey.
We used a multi-channel approach to disseminate our study di-
rectly within the operations community:
(1) A presentation at the 76th RIPE Meeting, which is the reg-
ular meeting of the local IP address authority for Europe,
the Middle-East, and Russia, where we also used the afore-
mentioned drawing-style to establish the brand, assuming
that brand recognition for a funny and appealing presenta-
tion [38] might convince operators to participate in our sur-
vey [37].
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Figure 2: Drawing style example of the questionnaire
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Figure 3: Responses per day
(2) Publishing articles in the blogs of the RIPENCC [39] andAP-
NIC [40], the latter of which is the address registry for Asia
and Oceania.
(3) Sending emails to operations mailing lists with several thou-
sand recipients.
(4) Social media activity in relevant industry communities ad-
vertising the survey.
We refrained from utilizing community and “question and answer”
sites like Server Fault [41] or Super User [42] because their respec-
tive terms of service prohibit advertising or conducting surveys (do-
ing so is often perceived as intrusive by operators). In fact, although
we only advertised our survey on mailing lists for which it was al-
lowed, we occasionally received negative feedback that our study
was unsolicited. We did not trace participation in the survey to a
specific dissemination channel, as we opted to not implement user
tracking in our questionnaire due to ethical concerns.
6 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Participation. We published our survey on July 19, 2017 and con-
cluded it 30 days later (August 17, 2017). In total, we received 231
responses, 80 percent of which were recorded in the first 15 days.
78 participants subscribed to our mailing list for updates on our
findings. Figure 3 shows how our dissemination efforts relate to the
number of participants of the questionnaire.
Filtering. We excluded ten responses from our analysis due to
incorrect or incomplete data. For four of these ten submissions no
datawas collected, potentially due toGoogle Formsmalfunctioning.
The six other respondents stated they had never worked as opera-
tors before, two of which additionally declared that they just liked
disrupting surveys. Hence, our analysis is based on the remaining
221 current and former operators.
Demographics. The majority of respondents works in Germany
(45.70%),butwealsoreceivednotablecontributions fromotherparts
of Europe, specifically theNetherlands, Switzerland, and theUnited
Kingdom(Figure 4(a)). Likelybecauseourdissemination focusedon
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Figure 4: Key demographics of the quantitative study
European organizations, other parts of the world are underrepre-
sented. However, considering the increasing internationalization,
especially in IT industries, we do not regard this as a significant
limitation. That it is not a limitation is also being highlighted by
the distribution of age and experience of participants (Figure 4(b)
and Figure 4(c)), which is similar to that of other regions, for ex-
ample, as shown by earlier studies for the U.S.-centric operations
community [29]. Concerning the level of education, our results dif-
fer: 63.8%of all respondents have at least a Bachelor’s degree,which
stands in contrast to 41.7% in the last LISA salary survey [29]. Nev-
ertheless, this difference may be due to the eased accessibility and
lower personal financial cost of higher education in Europe, pos-
sibly because of larger public financial support [43]. These consid-
erations underline that our sample is—within its limitations (Sec-
tion 8)—representative concerning the underlying strata.
Employment Situation. For the results of our survey, 89.1% of op-
erators are employees, 8.2% are self-employed, and 2.7% are former
operators. Notably, nearly half (48.9%) of all participants consider
their position to be at least partially a managerial position (e.g., as
team leaders). We also find a reasonable variety in terms of indus-
tries that the participants work in: Spanning from IT enterprises
to ISPs to government organizations and organizations that do not
operate in the IT sector, but who rely on IT to support their core
business operations.
6.1 SecurityMisconfiguration Frequency
Our first observation fromour qualitative study is that securitymis-
configurations are an (even more) common issue than reported (se-
curity) incidents indicate. Since security misconfigurations carry
a certain amount of guilt, operators may not be upfront or hon-
est when being asked aboutmisconfigurations that they personally
created (i.e., if there are no “blameless postmortems”). Therefore,
we separated the involved responsibility domains (Section 5) and
we first asked the operators whether they hadmisconfigured some-
thing themselves, and thenwhether they had found somebody else’s
misconfiguration.
For the former self-reflective part, we also provided operators
with the option to acknowledge that they may have misconfigured
something, which they yet have to notice. We also inquired if any
of the discovered misconfigurations led to a security incident. Fur-
thermore, to also include cases forwhich the operators did not fully
share our understanding of a security misconfiguration, we subse-
quently presented them with a list of possible misconfigurations
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SMKs in general
Any specific SMK
Lead to incident
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Participants (%)
(a) Self-made Misconfigurations
SMKs in general
Any specific SMK
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
Participants (%)
(b) Encountered Misconfigurations
Yes Not that I know No
Figure 5: Operators response on whether they conducted
misconfigurations (a), or, encountered misconfigurations
(b), split by their responses in general and when asking for
specificmisconfigurations.
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Figure 6: Most common security misconfiguration types
operators encountered/did themselves.
based on our qualitative study. Again, we asked whether these mis-
configurations had happened to them, and/or, if they encountered
them.
From 221 operators, 170 (76.92%) acknowledge that theymiscon-
figured a system and 68 (30.8%) state that at least one misconfig-
uration led to a security incident (Figure 5). Nine operators (4.1%)
state that one of their own security misconfigurations led to a se-
curity incident, contradicting their prior statements that they are
not aware of securitymisconfigurations that they committed in the
past.Thismay be explained by different notions of securitymiscon-
figurations. If we consider the answers to specific incidents, then
the number of operators acknowledging their own securitymiscon-
figurations rises to 196 (88.7%). Furthermore, when prompting for
specificmisconfigurations theyhadencountered, onlyoneoperator
(0.5%) claims to have never encountered any of the specific miscon-
figurations we mentioned, or even encountered one in general.
Looking closer at specific types of misconfigurations (Table 3),
the average operator made more than four different kinds of mis-
configurations (4.3) and encountered more than eight (8.4). Out of
twelve presented misconfigurations, the most common self-made
ones are delayed or missing updates, faulty scripting, and faulty fire-
wall configuration (Figure 6). Among the encountered misconfigu-
rations, weak or default passwords, delayed or missing updates, and
faulty assignment of permissions are the most frequently selected
misconfigurations (also Figure 6).Themost interesting observation
here is that, with a deviation of around 20%, the relative frequency
for self-made and encounteredmisconfigurationsmatch, except for
cases that are straight-forward violations of operational best prac-
tices (weakor default authentication credentials (password), insuffi-
cient securityhardening,andmisusingsystems).Weconjecture that
thedifferencemayberelated toavoidanceofnegative self-reflection
in our participants.
Discussion. Overall, close to all respondents of our survey en-
countered security sensitivemisconfigurations in practice.This cor-
responds to our qualitative interviews, in which all interview part-
ners encountered misconfigurations and shared a multitude of re-
lated experiences. Nevertheless, we see a tendency of operators to
be more willing to acknowledge misconfigurations if it does not
attribute guilt to them. In line with our qualitative interviews, it
highlights the importanceof blameless postmortems.Concerningmis-
configuration types, weak or default passwords, lax permissions,
and delayed (security) updates are themost frequent issues, closely
followed by insufficient and too permissive firewall rules. Interest-
ingly, thesearealso the typesofmisconfigurations thatare regularly
considered responsible for major data leaks [44].
6.2 Organizational Factors andManagement
In our questionnaire, we asked the operators which misconfigura-
tion facilitating factors they identified for misconfigurations that
they encountered during their work. The most frequent personal
factors are a lack of knowledge (78.73%) and a lack of experience
(75.57%), which aligns with our qualitative interviews, where par-
ticipants frequently mentioned that missing experience and a lack
of knowledge are major issues.
In the context of environmental factors, the most frequent rea-
sons are sole responsibility (76.92%) and insufficient quality assur-
ance (73.30%).Thegeneral picture here is that during the qualitative
interviews, the focuswason social issues,whileduring thequestion-
naire study organizational aspects appear to stand out.Thismay be
attributable to the different circumstances induced by the qualita-
tive and the quantitativemethodology [45], that is, the difference is
because social issues are more likely to be voiced during the (seem-
ingly) less formal interviews rather than a survey. This may also
play a role in why the usage of defaults is the most common sys-
temic factor, while it was only infrequently mentioned during the
interviews: Respondents may not have felt comfortable to discuss
it, as it is stigmatized as a form of personal failure.
Turning toward the management, we find that operators con-
sider poor “financial decisions” and “unqualified leadership” less of
an issue than the initial qualitative interviews indicated. While our
interview partners were quite vivid about their perspective on the
quality of their leadership, only littlemore than a third of operators
(39.37%) seeunqualified leadershipas a cause for securitymisconfig-
urations. Similarly, less than a third of respondents (30.77%) point to
financial decisions as being a cause for security misconfigurations.
Surprisingly, operators seem to agree that their direct supervisors
understand what they do (Table 4, line 7).
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However, when investigating this opinion more closely, we find
that it is impacted by an operator’s organizations’ type. Operators
from organizations without an IT background (avg. 0.534) and the
government sector (avg. 0.474) are significantly less convinced that
their superiors know what they are doing (p < 0:05 in Pearson’s
χ2) than those from IT service providers (avg. 0.832) and IT enter-
prises (avg. 0.810). Similarly, freelancers are less convinced (avg.
0.278) that their direct superiors, that is, their customers, under-
stand what they are doing, compared to employed operators (an
average of 0.784 for full-time employees and 0.864 for part-time em-
ployees with p < 0:05 in Pearson’s χ2). In our sample, the occur-
rence of freelancers in a company is not significantly co-dependent
on the sector (p > 0:15 in Pearson’s χ2).
Considering results from the Opinions section of our survey (Ta-
ble 4), Statement 10 (“I trust all the tools and equipment we’re us-
ing.”) is of particular interest: Operators seem to generally distrust
the tools that they are using and need to rely on, with a global av-
erage of -0.651. In fact, it correlates with the operators’ experience.
“Younger” operators still trust their tools (< 1 year in the field, avg.
0.400), while less junior operators already start to distrust them (1-3
years operating experience, avg. 0.050). After three years of expe-
rience in the field, the disagreement rises further (3-5 years experi-
ence, avg. -0.462), and the trust only decreases over time, culminat-
ing at an average disagreement of -1.032 for operators with more
than 20 years experience. This effect is significant at p < 0:005 in
Pearson’s χ2 and naturally co-correlates with the operators’ age.
Discussion. Based onour survey,we can assert that operators see
major obstacles for secure operations and preventing security mis-
configurations on the organizational side.We also find that the sec-
tor of an organization has an impact on the (perceived) IT aptitude
of the operators’ managers. While this might be expected, we sug-
gest that non-IT organizations take special care to offer additional
training for ITmiddlemanagerswhoarepromoted into thisposition
fromdiverse backgrounds. Failing to do so could otherwise result in
an environment that facilitates misconfigurations.
Naturally, the focus of strategies to mitigate misconfigurations
should be on environmental features: Reducing sole responsibility,
introducing (more) quality assurance and automation, and, ensuring
that operators do not face unreasonable workloads. Indeed, several
personal factors, while commonly selected, may be co-dependent
on organizational factors and might be mitigated indirectly by ad-
dressing these organizational factors. For example, a lack of knowl-
edge or experience can bemitigated by reducing sole responsibility
and a four-eye policy, especially for sensitive or security-relevant
changes and junior operators.
The increasingly dwindling trust of operators in their tools over
the course of their careers is also an important matter that needs to
be addressed. We conjecture that it is a symptom of getting contin-
uously frustrated with tools not living up to their expectations and
promises.Unfortunately, this increasingdistrust and reluctance can
have negative effects on the deployment ofmitigations: If operators
do not trust them, then they might not (correctly) deploy them in
the first place, or they might try to find ways around them. In fact,
this effect corresponds to fundamental conclusions that analyzes of
decades of devastating incidents in safety science have made [46].
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Figure 7: Frequency of misconfiguration facilitating factors
based on shares of participants who have encountered
misconfigurations with these factors.
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Figure 8: Operators’ perceived impact of security misconfig-
urations and incidents on organizations security posture.
6.3 Incident Response
The third observation that we made based on our qualitative inter-
views is that operators suggest that a security incident due to amis-
configuration makes management and operations personnel (tem-
porarily) more security sensitive. Asking operators directly, 81.9%
either agree or strongly agree that the discovery of a security mis-
configuration has made them more security conscious, with 33.0%
strongly agreeing to that statement (Table 4 line 4). Similarly, 71%
of respondents are convinced that their company’s security pos-
ture improvedafterasecuritymisconfigurationwasdiscovered (Fig-
ure 8). However, 53% of respondents also report that an actual inci-
dent had an even higher impact on the organizations’ security pos-
ture than the discovery of misconfiguration that did not yet cause
an incident (Figure 8).
Several operators point out that security-relevant changes are
often planned but never implemented, were only active temporar-
ily (lasted for a while, but were then reverted), that management
was willing to improve but was unwilling to provide the necessary
resources to do so, or that management applied unreasonable secu-
rity metrics and measures. Some operators also highlight the lack
of security awareness and that the lack of distinct responsibilities
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No. Statement +2 +1 0  1  2 / Plot (%) Avg.
1 I feel responsible for keeping my operations secure. 144 67 5 1 1 3 1.615
2 I feel responsible for pointing out security issues to peers. 127 79 8 3 0 4 1.521
3 Blameless postmortems help to detect essential issues in corporate procedures. 95 76 22 6 2 20 1.274
4 The discovery of a security misconfiguration made me more cautious regarding security. 74 107 28 7 0 5 1.148
5 The threat of bad press after a security incident is what companies fear most. 65 85 33 13 2 23 1.000
6 The general priority of security rises after a security incident has happened. 49 100 42 18 2 10 0.834
7 My direct supervisor understands what I’m actually doing. 57 92 30 27 11 4 0.724
8 My direct supervisor knows the amount of work I’m doing. 34 108 30 35 10 4 0.558
9 In my company we keep up with security standards. 33 85 43 38 13 9 0.410
10 I trust all the tools and equipment we’re using. 5 30 51 78 51 6 -0.651
11 My company budgets for mistakes (such as misconfigurations and security incidents). 5 21 29 54 58 54 -0.832
Table 4: Overview of responses to opinion-based questions from the survey
contributes further to the problem. One operator adds that compa-
nies fear bad pressmost, a sentiment that operators generally agree
with (Table 4, line 5). In general, it points toward an uncoordinated
pictureof incident response andoverall bad securityposture in com-
panies, with only half (53.39%) of respondents agreeing that their
companies’ security postures are sufficient (Table 4, line 9).
Finally, as a measure to correctly handle the aftermath of a mis-
configuration incident, 77.4% of our respondents agree that blame-
less postmortems are important (Table 4, line 3). However, there
are significant differences between freelancers (avg. 0.867), and em-
ployed system operators (full-time avg. 1.325, part-time avg. 1.400)
(p  0:001 in Pearson’s χ2). Considering that most companies do
not budget for errors (Table 4, line 10), we conjecture that this is
due to freelancers serving as easy scapegoats in situations where
an organization pretends to perform a blameless ppostmortem
Summary. Overall, our quantitative survey aligns with the op-
erators’ suggestions from our qualitative interviews. However, ad-
ditional qualitative answers by the respondents indicate that even
changes that are implemented are not actually permanent, which
results in lapses in an organization’s security posture. Participants
also agree that blameless postmortems are fundamental for mean-
ingful, effective, and long-lasting incident response. Unfortunately,
for blameless postmortems to have impact, companies must em-
brace that (human) errors can andwill happen, and budget for their
eventual occurrence,which currently is not the case. Finally, if post-
mortems are supposed to be blameless,while still appointing blame,
then the impact on moral and their long-term effectiveness might
be devastating (e.g., eroding trust in leadership).
7 RELATEDWORK
We compare to relevant prior research in four categories: (i) stud-
ies of misconfigurations and mitigation efforts, (ii) usability stud-
ies concernedwith technical systems creating or preventing errors,
(iii) studies focusing on personal behavioral causes for security is-
sues, and (iv) research in safety sciences.
Misconfigurations and Mitigation. Kuhrer et al. found that large-
scale notification campaigns can significantly reduce the number
of Internet-connected systems that are misconfigured and could be
exploited to act as traffic amplifiers [47], and Czyz et al. reported
on a similar effort to reduce the number of NTP amplifiers [48].
However, in 2016, Fiebig et al. showed that such an improvement
instances was only temporary for publicly exposed Redis andmem-
cached services [6]. Springall et al. investigated Internet-wide mis-
configured publicly accessible FTP servers in 2016, but they did not
report whether they notified operators or whether misconfigura-
tions were amended in a temporary or permanent way [49]. Prior
work also confirmed that misconfigurations facilitate other equally
problematic security issues: mobile applications leaking sensitive
and private data [50], applications becoming vulnerable to denial of
serviceattacks [10, 11],websites turningmaliciousand infectingvis-
itorswithmalware [12], websitesmisusing its visitors tomine cryp-
tocurrency [51], andwebsites beingmodified to embarrass its oper-
ators via defacements [13, 14]. In fact, misconfigurations can even
lead to account compromises for some single sign-onprotocols [52].
Finding misconfigurations in IPv6 recently lead to more work
toward making IPv6 scannable or enumerable [53–55]. Czyz et al.
found that the same systems expose insufficiently protected ser-
vices, i.e. host misconfigured services, more often via IPv6 than via
IPv4 [56]. Similar, Borgolte et al. found several thousand critical sys-
tems to bemisconfigured in regard to their IPv6 security [55]. Inter-
estingly, Zhang et al. identified a correlation between themalicious-
ness andmisconfigurations in networks [57]. Apart from their secu-
rity impact,misconfigurations have long been an important subject
in the networking community: Mahajan et al. conducted a large-
scale investigation of BGP misconfigurations in 2002 [58], while
Le et al. used data mining to detect router misconfiguration [59].
Streibelt et al. investigated issues around BGP communities [60].
Usability and Technical Mitigations. Xu et al. created a system
to detect system design that facilitates misconfiguration and they
analyzed the configuration syntax of various popular Internet ser-
vices [61]. Similarly, already in 2007, Haber et al. distilled design
guidelines for systemoperations tools [62]. In2015,Xuetal. compre-
hensively analyzed how systems’ complexity leads to security mis-
configurations [63], and they survey technical approaches to reduce
security misconfigurations [64]. Keller et al. introduced ConfErr to
increase the resilience of systems to misconfigurations [65], and
Oliveira proposed designing systems that are mistake-aware [66].
Behavioral Studies. Fahl et al. reportedon their studyamongweb-
masterswhorunexpiredTLScertificates [67].Contrary toourstudy,
participants in the study by Fahl et al. mainly requested technolog-
ical changes to mitigate these misconfigurations. Krombholz et al.
investigated the challenges in configuring TLS correctly in a quali-
tative study, focusing on the usability aspects of the involved soft-
ware [9]. Acar et al. conduct a large-scale study on the sources that
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Android developers utilize while writing mobile applications, and,
thus, might lead to security issues [31]. While orthogonal on first
sight, it relates to our observations on operators mentioning them-
selves that misconfigurations are created in part by using online re-
sources that recommendproblematicconfigurations.Ontherecruit-
ing side of behavioral studies, Acar et al. investigate the challenges
in recruiting ameaningful sample of ITprofessionals viaGitHub for
studies to understand and improve their security decision-making
process [68]. To improve tools used by security operations centers,
Sundaramurthy et al. evaluate what inherent conflicts exist in the
objectives of security operations centers, how they manifest them-
selves in inefficiencies, andhowtheycanberesolvedeffectively [69].
Safety Science. Similar to the current state in computer security
andoperations, the initial focus insafetysciencewasonthesocalled
“sharp-end,” that is individual human errorwhile executing specific
actions [70]. However, it became apparent in the 1990s that an ap-
proach including organizational aspects and precursors is funda-
mental to effectivelymitigate human error: “Fallibility is here to stay.
Organizational and local problems, in contrast, are both diagnosable
and manageable.” [70].
A common example illustrating the underlying paradigm shift is
the case of MS Herald of Free Enterprise, which capsized only mo-
ments after departure in Zeebrugge in 1987 because a dockhand for-
got to close a shot.The initial report selectively investigated person-
centric causes, appointing responsibility to the humans involved.
Praetorius et al. re-analyzed this incident 25 years later from a sys-
temic perspective leveraging functional resonance analysismethod
(FRAM) [71].They determined that the incident does not have a sin-
gle cause and that human error is not one of the major causes, but
actually the contrary: The human error is a symptom of functional
resonance in various functions of the operation of the ship. Simi-
larly, Schröder-Hinrichs et al. investigated largemaritime incidents
from the R.M.S. Titanic to, most recently, the Costa Concordia, and
found the same underlying facilitating factors to be of cause [46].
8 LIMITATIONS
Due to our recruitment strategy (Section 5.2), our study may suf-
fer from (self-)selection bias. Our participants are likely to identify
with their work, as they are actively involved in the operators’ com-
munity. In turn, we may inadvertently exclude less active opera-
tors, which may have a different perception. However, as our re-
search also includes qualitative data such as anecdotes, reasoning
and opinions, we receive second hand information on the behav-
ior of operators who do not actively participate in the community
beyond their “nine-to-five” job (e.g., misconfigurations that opera-
tors encountered that they did not do themselves). Although, our
sample is comparatively small, our demographic distribution corre-
sponds to that of earlier studies, thus indicating a sufficiently strati-
fied sample [29]. As our analysis is based on self-reported data, it is
inherently biased by the participants’ perceptions.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we conducted the first systematic study of human as-
pects of securitymisconfigurations from the operators’ perspective.
Wefind that securitymisconfigurationsdonotnecessarily lead to in-
cidents: One third of respondents report that themisconfigurations
that they witnessed resulted in a security incident, even though all
of them could have led to a security incident.Theobservation that al-
most all participants encountered security misconfigurations may
be due to a self-selection bias among operators. Specifically, how-
ever, given the prevalence of security incidents caused by miscon-
figurations [2, 3, 44], even considering such a self-selection bias, our
data highlights that there is an even larger set of incidents waiting
to happen, which could be considerably more disastrous compared
to past misconfigurations incidents.
Based on our analysis, we find that human error in system opera-
tions is driven by institutional, organizational, and personal factors.
Ultimately, to reduce the frequency and impact of security miscon-
figurations, we recommend the subsequent immediate action items
that our study highlighted as necessary and useful, which are (un-
fortunately) rarely implementedbyorganizationsalthough theyare
often technically sound and well-known:
Documentation.
The state of any system and all of its components must be
properly documented, so that anyone can fully understand
it. Documentation must be updated immediately upon any
changes, and it must be regularly verified for correctness.
Clear Responsibilities.
Organizations must ensure that there is a single responsible
department for the security of each device, which has suffi-
cient authority over the device to ensure its appropriate se-
curity posture. No person shall bear sole responsibility, but
responsibility must be shared among multiple people. Orga-
nizations, especiallyoutsideof the ITsector,mustalsoensure
that their responsible middle management is qualified.
Blameless Postmortems.
Afteran incidentoccurred, its root causemust beunderstood,
and actionsmust be taken to prevent a similar incident in the
future. While companies appear to embrace a general post-
mortem culture, our results indicate that this does not neces-
sarilymean that postmortems are blameless. Hence, the inci-
dent postmortemmust be constructive and, most important,
not appoint blame.Toencourageblamelesspostmortems,we
urge organizations to budget for failure and errors.
Processes and Procedures.
Allmanual changes to the systemmust be planned. Frequent
modificationsorconfigurationchangesshouldbeeliminated,
or automated and described in a process.
Automation.
Infrastructure and procedures shall be automated, to allow
operators to adopt (complex) procedures more easily. For ex-
ample, canary deployments and rollback plans can highlight
andtacklemisconfigurationsquickly.Theyhaveprohibitively
high cost if done manually, but they can often be automated,
thus highlighting the benefits of automation [72]. Nonethe-
less, these toolsmust be engineered to be reliable and should
not be a burden on operators. Software and protocols used
should be “secure by default” [33]. Considering the increas-
ing distrust in tools with operators’ experience, this area re-
quiresmorework to regain the operators’ trust into available
tools, as well as to increase the tools’ trustworthiness.
Fire Drills.
Regular exercises (“fire drills”) shall also be performed to un-
derstand thesecurity implicationsof thecurrent system,how
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it can be improved, and to train operators and management
inproper incidenthandlingprocedures.Ultimately, firedrills
can help managers from different backgrounds to better un-
derstand the implications of IT operations.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions to
improve the paper. We also thank Sascha Fahl for his valuable feed-
back.Wearegrateful to theRIPEAcademic Initiative (RACI) for sup-
porting this research project with a full scholarship to attend RIPE
76, as well as RIPE NCC and APNIC for helping us disseminate our
survey via their blogs. We also extend our gratitude to the German
Network Operators Group (DENOG), who supported our research
and provided valuable feedback from the early stages.
This material is partially funded by SBA Research. The compe-
tence center SBA Research (SBA-K1) is funded within the frame-
work of COMET –Competence Centers for Excellent Technologies
by theAustrianMinistry for Transport, Innovation andTechnology
(BMVIT), the Austrian Federal Ministry for Digital and Economic
Affairs (BMDW), and the federal state of Vienna, managed by the
Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG).
REFERENCES
[1] A. Bühl. Stellungnahme zum Antisemitismus des Peter Beuth (1781 – 1853). June 1,
2017. url: http://www.beuth-hochschule.de/fileadmin/oe/praesidium/portraet/
beuth-diskurs/Beuth_Stellungnahme_Buehl.pdf.
[2] T. Moore. “On the Harms Arising from the Equifax Data Breach of 2017”. In: In-
ternational Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection 19.C (Dec. 2017). doi: 10.
1016/j.ijcip.2017.10.004.
[3] D. Hedley and M. Jacobs. “The shape of things to come: the Equifax breach, the
GDPR and open-source security”. In: Computer Fraud & Security 2017.11 (Nov.
2017). doi: 10.1016/S1361-3723(17)30080-5.
[4] R. Brandom. Former Equifax CEO blames breach on a single person who failed to
deploy patch. Oct. 3, 2017. url: https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/3/16410806/
equifax-ceo-blame-breach-patch-congress-testimony (visited on 11/29/2017).
[5] K. Borgolte, T. Fiebig, S. Hao, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. “Cloud Strife: Mitigating
the Security Risks of Domain-Validated Certificates”. In: Proceedings of the 25th
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). Feb. 2018. doi: 10 .
14722/ndss.2018.23327.
[6] T. Fiebig, A. Feldmann, and M. Petschick. “A One-Year Perspective on Exposed
In-memory Key-Value Stores”. In: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Au-
tomated DecisionMaking for Active Cyber Defense (SafeConfig). Oct. 24, 2016. doi:
10.1145/2994475.2994480.
[7] B. Rossi. Major security alert as 40,000 MongoDB databases left unsecured on the
Internet. Feb. 10, 2015. url: http://www.information-age.com/major- security-
alert- 40000-mongodb-databases- left- unsecured- internet- 123459001/ (visited
on 10/25/2017).
[8] S. Ragan. MongoDB configuration error exposed 93 million Mexican voter records.
Apr. 22, 2016. url: https : / / www . csoonline . com / article / 3060204 / security /
mongodb- configuration- error- exposed- 93-million-mexican- voter- records .
html (visited on 10/25/2017).
[9] K. Krombholz,W.Mayer,M. Schmiedecker, and E.Weippl. ““I HaveNo IdeaWhat
I’m Doing”-On the Usability of Deploying HTTPS”. In: Proceedings of the 26th
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security). Aug. 2017. url: https : / /www.
usenix . org / conference / usenixsecurity17 / technical - sessions / presentation /
krombholz.
[10] T.Spring.MisconfiguredMemcachedServersAbused toAmplifyDDoSAttacks.Threat-
Post. Feb. 28, 2018. url: https : / / threatpost . com/misconfigured - memcached -
servers-abused-to-amplify-ddos-attacks/130150/ (visited on 08/05/2018).
[11] W.Meng, C.Qian, S.Hao, K. Borgolte, G. Vigna, C. Kruegel, andW. Lee. “Rampart:
Protecting Web Applications from CPU-Exhaustion Denial-of-Service Attacks”.
In: Proceedings of the 27th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security). Aug.
2018. url: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity18/presentation/
meng.
[12] K. Borgolte, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. “Delta: Automatic Identification of Un-
knownWeb-based InfectionCampaigns”. In: Proceedings of the 20thACMSIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). Nov. 2013. doi: 10.
1145/2508859.2516725.
[13] K. Borgolte, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. “Meerkat: DetectingWebsite Defacements
through Image-based Object Recognition”. In: Proceedings of the 24th USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security). Aug. 2015. url: https://www.usenix.org/
conference/usenixsecurity15/technical-sessions/presentation/borgolte.
[14] F. Maggi, M. Balduzzi, R. Flores, L. Gu, and V. Ciancaglini. “InvestigatingWebDe-
facement Campaigns at Large”. In: Proceedings of the 13th ACM ASIA Conference
on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS). June 2018. doi: 10.1145/
3196494.3196542.
[15] M.Bailey,D.Dittrich, E. Kenneally, andD.Maughan. “TheMenloReport”. In: IEEE
Security & Privacy 10.2 (Mar. 2012). doi: 10.1109/MSP.2012.52.
[16] D. Dittrich and E. Kenneally. The Menlo Report: Ethical Principles Guiding Infor-
mation and Communication Technology Research. Tech. rep. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Aug. 2012. url: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/CSD-MenloPrinciplesCORE-20120803_1.pdf.
[17] C. Herley and P. C. van Oorschot. “SoK: Science, Security and the Elusive Goal
of Security as a Scientific Pursuit”. In: Proceedings of the 38th IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy (S&P). May 2017. doi: 10.1109/SP.2017.38.
[18] Provalis Research.QDAMiner Lite – FreeQualitative Data Analysis Software. url:
https : / /provalisresearch . com/products /qualitative - data - analysis - software /
freeware/ (visited on 09/13/2017).
[19] S. B. Merriam and E. J. Tisdell.Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design and Imple-
mentation. 4th ed. Jossey-Bass, Aug. 24, 2015. isbn: 978-1119003618.
[20] K. Charmaz.ConstructingGroundedTheory: A Practical Guide throughQualitative
Analysis. SAGE Publications, Jan. 27, 2006. isbn: 978-0761973522.
[21] J. Lazar, J. H. Feng, and H. Hochheiser. Research Methods in Human-Computer
Interaction. 2nd ed. Morgan Kaufmann, May 3, 2017. isbn: 978-0128053904.
[22] B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss. The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for
Qualitative Research. Transaction Publishers, 1967. isbn: 978-0202302607.
[23] A. Strauss and J. Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Proce-
dures and Techniques. SAGE Publications, Sept. 1, 1990. isbn: 978-0803932517.
[24] B. G. Glaser. Basics of GroundedTheory Analysis: Emergence vs Forcing. Sociology
Press, Dec. 1, 1992. isbn: 978-1884156007.
[25] A. Naiakshina, A. Danilova, C. Tiefenau, M. Herzog, S. Dechand, and M. Smith.
“WhyDoDevelopersGetPasswordStorageWrong?AQualitativeUsabilityStudy”.
In: Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGSACConference on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (CCS). Oct. 2017. doi: 10.1145/3133956.3134082.
[26] V. Braun and V. Clarke. “Using thematic analysis in psychology”. In:Qualitative
Research in Psychology 3.2 (2006). doi: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa.
[27] Y. Acar, S. Fahl, and M. L. Mazurek. “You are Not Your Developer, Either: A Re-
search Agenda for Usable Security and Privacy Research Beyond End Users”. In:
Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Cybersecurity Development (SecDev). Nov. 2016. doi:
10.1109/SecDev.2016.013.
[28] G. Halprin. The Work Flow of System Administration. Tech. rep. The SysAdmin
Group, June 25, 1998. url: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=
10.1.1.126.3466&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
[29] USENIX LISA. USENIX Special Interest Group for Sysadmins: The 2011 Salary Sur-
vey. 2011. url: https://www.usenix.org/sysadmin- salary- surveys (visited on
11/29/2017).
[30] R. Dhamija, J. D. Tygar, and M. Hearst. “Why PhishingWorks”. In: Proceedings of
the 2006 ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. Apr.
2006. doi: 10.1145/1124772.1124861.
[31] Y. Acar, M. Backes, S. Fahl, D. Kim, M. L. Mazurek, and C. Stransky. “You Get
WhereYou’re Looking For:The ImpactOf Information Sources onCode Security”.
In: Proceedings of the 37th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (S&P). May 2016.
doi: 10.1109/SP.2016.25.
[32] J. J. Francis, M. Johnston, C. Robertson, L. Glidewell, V. Entwistle, M. P. Eccles,
and J.M. Grimshaw. “What is an adequate sample size?Operationalising data sat-
uration for theory-based interview studies”. In: Psychology & Health 25.10 (2010).
doi: 10.1080/08870440903194015.
[33] T. Fiebig, F. Lichtblau, F. Streibelt, T. Krüger, P. Lexis, R. Bush, and A. Feldmann.
“Learning from the Past: Designing Secure Network Protocols”. In: Cybersecurity
Best Practices. 2018.
[34] Pokemon Institute. 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study: Global Overview. Tech. rep.
IBM, July 2017. url: https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach.
[35] Google LLC.Google Forms - create and analyze surveys, for free.url: https://www.
google.com/forms/about/ (visited on 10/03/2017).
[36] R. Likert. “ATechnique for theMeasurement ofAttitudes”. In:Archives of Psychol-
ogy 22.140 (1932). LCCN: 33012634.
[37] T.-M. Karjalainen and D. Snelders. “Designing Visual Recognition for the Brand”.
In: Journal of Product InnovationManagement 27.1 (Jan. 2010). doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
5885.2009.00696.x.
[38] C. Dietrich. Caught between Security and Time Pressure. Presentation at RIPE 74.
May 9, 2017. url: https://ripe74.ripe.net/archives/video/54/.
[39] C. Dietrich. On the Operators’ Perspective on Security Misconfigurations –The Sur-
vey. RIPE Labs Blog. July 17, 2017. url: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/constanze_
dietrich/on- the- operators- perspective- on- security-misconfigurations- the-
survey.
13
CCS ’18, October 15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada Constanze Dietrich, Katharina Krombholz, Kevin Borgolte, and Tobias Fiebig
[40] C. Dietrich. Survey: Operators’ perspective on security misconfigurations. APNIC
Blog. Aug. 1, 2017. url: https://blog.apnic.net/2017/08/01/survey- operators-
perspective-security-misconfigurations/.
[41] StackExchange.ServerFault. url:https://serverfault.com/ (visitedon10/23/2017).
[42] Stack Exchange. Super User. url: https://superuser.com/ (visited on 10/23/2017).
[43] G. Brunello and R. Winter-Ebmer. “Why Do Students Expect to Stay Longer in
College? Evidence from Europe”. In: Economics Letters 80.2 (Aug. 2003). doi: 10.
1016/S0165-1765(03)00086-7.
[44] T. Fiebig. “An empirical evaluation ofmisconfiguration in Internet services”. PhD
thesis. Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, Sept. 8, 2017. doi: 10 .
14279/depositonce-6140.
[45] J. A. Holstein and J. F. Gubrium.TheActive Interview. SAGE Publications, Apr. 20,
1995. isbn: 978-0803958951.
[46] J.-U. Schröder-Hinrichs, E. Hollnagel, and M. Baldauf. “From Titanic to Costa
Concordia—a century of lessons not learned”. In: WMU Journal of Maritime Af-
fairs 11.2 (Oct. 1, 2012). doi: 10.1007/s13437-012-0032-3.
[47] M. Kührer, T. Hupperich, C. Rossow, and T. Holz. “Exit from Hell? Reducing the
Impact of Amplification DDoS Attacks”. In: Proceedings of the 23rd USENIX Secu-
rity Symposium (USENIX Security). Aug. 2014. url: https : / /www.usenix . org /
conference/usenixsecurity14/technical-sessions/presentation/kuhrer.
[48] J. Czyz, M. Kallitsis, M. Gharaibeh, C. Papadopoulos, M. Bailey, and M. Karir.
“Taming the 800 Pound Gorilla: The Rise and Decline of NTP DDoS Attacks”. In:
Proceedings of the 2014 Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). Nov. 2014. doi:
10.1145/2663716.2663717.
[49] D. Springall, Z. Durumeric, and J. A. Halderman. “FTP:The Forgotten Cloud”. In:
Proceedings of the 46th IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks (DSN). June 2016. doi: 10.1109/DSN.2016.52.
[50] J. Ren, M. Lindorfer, D. Dubois, A. Rao, D. Choffnes, and N. Vallina-Rodriguez.
“Bug Fixes, Improvements, … and Privacy Leaks – A Longitudinal Study of PII
Leaks Across Android App Versions”. In: Proceedings of the 25th Network and Dis-
tributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). Feb. 2018. doi: 10.14722/ndss.2018.
23143.
[51] R. K. Konoth, E. Vineti, V. Moonsamy, M. Lindorfer, C. Kruegel, H. Bos, and G.
Vigna. “MineSweeper: An In-depth Look into Drive-by Cryptocurrency Mining
and Its Defense”. In: Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGSACConference on Computer
and Communications Security (CCS). Oct. 2018. doi: 10.1145/3243734.3243858.
[52] Y. Cao, Y. Shoshitaishvili, K. Borgolte, C. Kruegel, G. Vigna, and Y. Chen. “Protect-
ing Web Single Sign-on against Relying Party Impersonation Attacks through a
Bi-directional Secure Channel with Authentication”. In: Proceedings of the 17th
International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (RAID). Sept.
2014. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_14.
[53] O. Gasser, Q. Scheitle, S. Gebhard, and G. Carle. “Scanning the IPv6 Internet: To-
wardsaComprehensiveHitlist”. In:Proceedingsof the2016 InternationalWorkshop
on Traffic Monitoring and Analysis (TMA). arXiv: 1607.05179v1. Apr. 2016.
[54] T. Fiebig, K. Borgolte, S.Hao, C. Kruegel, andG.Vigna. “Something FromNothing
(There): Collecting Global IPv6 Datasets From DNS”. In: Proceedings of the 12th
Passive andActiveMeasurement (PAM). Mar. 2017. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-54328-
4_3.
[55] K. Borgolte, S. Hao, T. Fiebig, and G. Vigna. “Enumerating Active IPv6 Hosts for
Large-scale Security Scans viaDNSSEC-signedReverse Zones”. In: Proceedings of
the 39th IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (S&P). May 2018. doi: 10.1109/SP.
2018.00027.
[56] J. Czyz, M. Luckie, M. Allman, and M. Bailey. “Don’t Forget to Lock the Back
Door! A Characterization of IPv6 Network Security Policy”. In: Proceedings of the
23rd Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). Feb. 2016. doi:
10.14722/ndss.2016.23047.
[57] J. Zhang, Z. Durumeric, M. Bailey, M. Liu, and M. Karir. “On the Mismanage-
ment and Maliciousness of Networks”. In: Proceedings of the 21st Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). Feb. 2014. doi: 10 . 14722 /ndss .
2014.23057.
[58] R. Mahajan, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson. “Understanding BGP misconfigura-
tion”. In: Proceedings of the 2002 ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM). Aug.
2002. doi: 10.1145/633025.633027.
[59] F. Le, S. Lee,T.Wong,H.S.Kim, andD.Newcomb. “Minerals:UsingDataMining to
Detect RouterMisconfigurations”. In: Proceedings of the 2016Workshop onMining
Network Data (MineNet). Sept. 15, 2006. doi: 10.1145/1162678.1162681.
[60] F.Streibelt, F.Lichtblau,R.Beverly,A.Feldmann,C.Pelsser,G.Smaragdakis, andR.
Bush. “BGPCommunities: EvenmoreWorms in theRoutingCan”. In: Proceedings
of the 2018 Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). Nov. 2018.
[61] T. Xu, J. Zhang, P. Huang, J. Zheng, T. Sheng, D. Yuan, Y. Zhou, and S. Pasupathy.
“DoNot BlameUsers forMisconfigurations”. In: Proceedings of the 24thACMSym-
posium on Operating Systems Principles (SOSP). Nov. 2013. doi: 10.1145/2517349.
2522727.
[62] E. M. Haber and J. Bailey. “Design Guidelines for System Administration Tools
DevelopedThrough Ethnographic Field Studies”. In: Proceedings of the 2007 ACM
Symposium on Computer Human Interaction for the Management of Information
Technology (CHMIT). Mar. 2007. doi: 10.1145/1234772.1234774.
[63] T. Xu, L. Jin, X. Fan, Y. Zhou, S. Pasupathy, and R. Talwadker. “Hey, You Have
Given Me Too Many Knobs!: Understanding and Dealing with Over-designed
Configuration in System Software”. In: Proceedings of the 2015 10th Joint Meet-
ing on Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE). Aug. 2015. doi: 10.1145/
2786805.2786852.
[64] T. Xu and Y. Zhou. “Systems Approaches to Tackling Configuration Errors: A
Survey”. In: ACMComputing Surveys 47.4 (July 2015). doi: 10.1145/2791577.
[65] L. Keller, P. Upadhyaya, andG. Candea. “ConfErr: ATool forAssessingResilience
toHumanConfigurationErrors”. In:Proceedingsof the38th IEEE/IFIP International
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). June 2008. doi: 10.1109/
DSN.2008.4630084.
[66] F. A. D. de Oliveira. “Towards Mistake-Aware Systems”. PhD thesis. Rutgers Uni-
versity, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Oct. 2010. doi: 10.7282/T3N58M3J.
[67] S. Fahl, Y.Acar,H. Perl, andM. Smith. “WhyEveandMallory (Also) LoveWebmas-
ters: A Study on the Root Causes of SSLMisconfigurations”. In: Proceedings of the
9th ACMASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS).
July 2014. doi: 10.1145/2590296.2590341.
[68] Y. Acar, C. Stransky, D.Wermke, M. L. Mazurek, and S. Fahl. “Security Developer
Studies with GitHub Users: Exploring a Convenience Sample”. In: Proceedings of
the 13th SymposiumOnUsable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). June 2017. url: https:
//www.usenix.org/conference/soups2017/technical-sessions/presentation/acar.
[69] S. C. Sundaramurthy, J. McHugh, X. Ou, M. Wesch, A. G. Bardas, and S. R. Ra-
jagopalan. “TurningContradictions into Innovationsor:HowWeLearned to Stop
Whiningand ImproveSecurityOperations”. In:Proceedings of the12thSymposium
OnUsable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). June 2016. url: https://www.usenix.org/
conference/soups2016/technical-sessions/presentation/sundaramurthy.
[70] J. Reason. “Safety in the operating theatre – Part 2: Human error and organisa-
tional failure”. In:Quality and Safety in Health Care 14.1 (Feb. 2005). doi: 10.1016/
S0953-7112(05)80010-9.
[71] G.Praetorius,M.Lundh,andM.Lützhöft. “LearningFromThePastForPro-activity
– A Re-analysis Of The Accident Of The MV Herald Of Free Enterprise”. In: Pro-
ceedings of the 4th Resilience Engineering Symposium. June 2011. doi: 10 . 4000 /
books.pressesmines.1089.
[72] T. A. Limoncelli, C. J. Hogan, and S. R. Chalup.ThePractice of System andNetwork
Administration: Volume 1: DevOps and other Best Practices for Enterprise IT. 3rd ed.
Addison-Wesley Professional, Nov. 14, 2016. isbn: 978-0321919168.
A QUESTIONNAIRE
The questionnaire uses the following structure:Questions in bold are re-
quired. Circles denote single selection answers. Boxes denote optional
multiple selection answers. Tableswith circles denote single responseper
row. Tableswith boxes denote optionalmultiple responses per row.Ques-
tions without selections allow free text answers.
Please note:The wording of this example questionnaire is for employees.
In our study, participants were shown specific wording based on their
selection during “For Starters.”
Welcome Page
Misconfigurations happen
We are all human beings and we make mistakes. (At least I’m fairly sure
I’mnot theonlyone.)Therefore,weassume that faulty security configura-
tions thatmay lead or evenhave lead to leaked, lost or distorted datamust
be a lot more common than we perceive them to be. We want to explore
what experiences YOU, the operators, have had with misconfigurations -
regardless of whether they happened to yourselves, you discovered them
or you were the ones fixing them.
We also believe that knowing how they occur may allow for measures to
reduce the risk of misconfigurations - measures not only addressing the
operators, but all departments through all levels of management that af-
fect the design and maintenance of a system in some way.Therefore, the
14
Investigating SystemOperators’ Perspective on Security Misconfigurations CCS ’18, October 15–19, 2018, Toronto, ON, Canada
following questions aren’t designed to only gather abstract data but to
also incorporate your personal views and opinions - if you want. :)
This survey is the main task of my master thesis in media informatics at
the Beuth University of Applied Sciences in collaboration with the Tech-
nical University Berlin.2
Your answers remain entirely anonymous.We’re not aiming for sensitive
information. Nevertheless, be assured thatwe hold ourselves responsible
for preserving your anonymity.
Weneed you!
Wealready learned that operators areusuallyquite busyoperating things;
but if you can spare 10 to 20 minutes to fill out this questionnaire, please
do! Each and every contribution is important and helps us and eventually
fellow operators a lot!
PS
If you’d like to get brief updates and a summary of our findings, youmay
leave your email adress at the end of the survey in a separate form. Also,
if you happen to answer these questions on your phone, they render best
after switching to landscape mode.
For Starters
Tomake the questions serve your current situation.
(1) Are you employed, self-employed or out of work? If you’re
a student, please choose what you do besides studying.# I’m employed part-time.# I’m employed full-time.# I’m my own boss.# I do not work at the moment.
Your Job
To get an idea of what you’re dealing with day by day.
(1) What is your current job title?
(2) Does your job title match what you’re actually doing?# YES.# More or less.# NO.
(3) What kind of business do you work for? Please refer to the
core business of the company you work for.# IT Service Provider (such as internet, network, storage, applica-
tion as a service).# IT Enterprise (e.g. software company).# Non-IT Enterprise (core businesses other than IT).# Government/ Public Services.
2Affiliation changed to TU Delft before the research project was completed.
(4) What is the approximate total number of employees your
company has?# 1 - 3# 4 - 9# 10 - 49# 50 - 999# 1,000 - 4,999# 5,000 or more# I don’t know.
(5) Job titles aside –Doyouoperate IT systems?Do you consider
yourself an operator or have you worked as an operator before?# YES, I work as an operator.# YES, but it’s not mymain task.# NO, but I worked as an operator before.# NO. Never. But I like trolling surveys.
Your Job #2
(1) What kind of IT systems do you operate how often?
Ne
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Oft
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Computer Operating Systems # # # # #
Storage Systems # # # # #
Database Systems # # # # #
Web Server / Mail Systems # # # # #
Networks / Infrastructure # # # # #
(2) Howwouldyoudescribeyourlevelofexpertise inoperating
these systems?
No
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Qu
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Ve
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Computer Operating Systems # # # # #
Storage Systems # # # # #
Database Systems # # # # #
Web Server / Mail Systems # # # # #
Networks / Infrastructure # # # # #
(3) Howmuch of your work is ”operating”?# 10%# 20%# 30%# 40%# 50%# 60%# 70%# 80%# 90%# 100%# More than 100%
(4) What kind of tasks do you do besides operating?
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(5) How long have youworked as an operator overall?# Less than 1 year.# 1 up to 3 years.# More than 3 up to 5 years.# More than 5 up to 10 years.# More than 10 up to 20 years.# More than 20 years.
(6) Is your job a management position? Do you get to make deci-
sions on budget, equipment, staffing…?# YES.# More or less.# NO.
Issues
To get you in the right mood.
(1) How would you rate the severity of each of the following sce-
narios? Imagine any kind of company with 1,000 employees and
100,000 users. See Table 5.
Your Experiences
We focus on deficient configurations that affect the security of a system.
Hence, when answering these questions concerning misconfigurations,
please check whether CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY or AVAILABIL-
ITY may have gotten compromised or actually were compromised (and
therewith led to a security incident).
(1) Have you misconfigured something that was relevant for
the security of a system?Regardless ofwhether therewere con-
sequences–Haveyouevermisconfigured something that affected
security?# YES.# Not that I’m aware of.# NO. Never.
(2) Have you misconfigured something that eventually led to
a security incident? Security incidentsmight be: Attempts from
unauthorized sources to access systems or data/ unplanned dis-
ruption to a service or denial of a service/ unauthorized process-
ing or storage of data/ unauthorized changes to system hardware,
firmware, or software/ …# YES.# Not that I’m aware of.# NO.
(3) Haveyoueverencounteredasecuritymisconfigurationmade
by someone else?# YES.# Not that I’m aware of.# NO.
(4) Whichof these common securitymisconfigurations did youmake
yourselfand/orhaveyouencountereddonebysomeoneelse?Please
makesure that themisconfigurations that cometoyourmindwere
actually security-related.
Ha
pp
en
ed
to
me
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Bad or publicly known passwords 2 2
Faulty or missing authentication 2 2
Faulty assignment of permissions 2 2
Delayed or missing updates 2 2
Faulty firewall configuration 2 2
Faulty scripting 2 2
Faulty storage configuration (e.g no safe backups) 2 2
Missing encryption 2 2
Faulty or no hardening (e.g. unneeded ports left open) 2 2
Deployment
of revealing information (e.g. extended logfiles)
2 2
Inconsistent system integration 2 2
Misused or improperly
shared system (e.g. test/productive, internal/external)
2 2
(5) Whatothersecuritymisconfigurationsdidyoumakeorencounter?
Did we miss something?
(6) How did you come across those security misconfigurations you
encountered? Did you stumble upon them while working? Were
they discovered while troubleshooting a security incident? Did
you spot a ticket/issue?
(7) Howmany of the securitymisconfigurations that led to a security
incident were known beforehand?
Out of all the security incidents caused by misconfigurations, in
howmany cases was themisconfiguration already recognized be-
fore the incident happened?# None of them.# Few of them.# Half of them.# Most of them.# All of them.# I’m not sure. / Does not apply.
Reasons
(1) Which of the following individual reasons actually have been rea-
sons for securitymisconfigurations you either did yourself or you
have encountered?2 Lack of experience2 Lack of knowledge2 Blunder, mishap, oblivion2 Usage of poor (online) resources2 Fear of asking for help2 Having other priorities2 Lack of concern
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(2) Were there environmental reasons?2 Insufficient or no quality assurance (testing, scanning)2 Sole responsibility/no review (e.g. peer review )2 Manual configuration (as opposed to automation)2 Insufficient (corporate) documentation2 Insufficient communication2 Vague or undefined operating procedures2 Insufficient or no preliminary planning2 Financial decisions2 Unqualified leadership2 Time pressure2 Work overload
(3) Were there system-specific reasons?2 Complexity of the system2 Poor manufacturer’s/vendor’s documentation2 Bad usability2 Usage of defaults2 Uncommon conventions2 Legacy support issues
(4) What other reasons didwemiss? Since it’s impossible to list them
all: Which reasons would you take into account here?
Reactions
(1) Given the reasons for securitymisconfigurations – did something
getchangedafter theirdiscovery?Howdidyourcompanyrespond
to the securitymisconfiguration? If there were several cases of se-
curitymisconfigurations that hadquite different outcomes, please
refer to your overall impression.# YES.There were adjustments and it got BETTER overall.# NO. Basically nothing changed.# YES.There were adjustments and it gotWORSE overall.# I don’t know.# Other: (free text answer)
(2) Howwouldyoudescribe the impactof actual security incidentson
the management? Compared to security misconfigurations with-
out serious consequences – do actual security incidents like data
breaches or service outages affect the impact on security-related
business decisions?# LESS. After a security incident the management is less likely
willing to improve security.# SAME.The impact is the sameas for securitymisconfigurations
without serious consequences.# HIGHER. After a security incident the management is most
likely willing to improve security.
Your Opinion
# I don’t know.# Other: (free text answer)
(3) If you would like to go into detail… Is there something youwould
like to remark on that topic?
(1) To what extent would you agree with the following statements?
See Table 6.
(2) What software or hardware do you find especially hard to oper-
ate?Andwhy? Is there something that seriouslyannoysyouevery
time you have to touch it? For what reason?
Demographics
(1) How old are you?# Under 18 years.# 18-24 years.# 25-34 years.# 35-44 years.# 45-54 years.# 55-64 years.# 65 years or older.
(2) What is the highest degree or level of education you have com-
pleted?# Some high school, no diploma.# High school diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED).# Some college courses, no degree.# Career/technical/vocational education.# Bachelor’s/undergraduate degree.# Master’s/graduate/professional degree.# Doctorate/post-graduate degree.# Other: (free text answer)
(3) In which country do youwork?
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Email addresses of 1000 users got leaked. # # # # #
100 users report their accounts have been disabled. # # # # #
100 users lose one hour of work done. # # # # #
10 non-operator work stations have administrator rights. # # # # #
100 users report the data they’re seeing isn’t theirs. # # # # #
Email addresses of all 100,000 users got leaked. # # # # #
For one hour 100 employees are unable to login to their work stations. # # # # #
10 employees report the database does not show yesterday’s changes. # # # # #
Work station login data of 100 employees is stored in a physical folder in a one-man office (on paper). # # # # #
Credit card information of 1000 users got leaked. # # # # #
The backup doesn’t match the actual data. # # # # #
The corporate mail server fails to filter certain spam. # # # # #
Table 5:Howwouldyou rate the severity of eachof the following scenarios? Imagine anykindof companywith 1,000 employees
and 100,000 users.
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My direct supervisor understands what I’m actually doing. # # # # # #
My direct supervisor knows the amount of work I’m doing. # # # # # #
The general priority of security rises after a security incident has happened. # # # # # #
The obligation to report certain security incidents is often not taken serious. # # # # # #
They taught me how to take care of misconfigured systems in school. # # # # # #
I trust all the tools and equipment we’re using. # # # # # #
The discovery of a security misconfiguration made me more cautious regarding security. # # # # # #
In my company we keep up with security standards. # # # # # #
Too many things are configurable. # # # # # #
Blameless postmortems help to detect essential issues in corporate procedures. # # # # # #
In my company we have a budget for mistakes (such as misconfiguratins and security incidents). # # # # # #
I feel responsible for keeping my operations secure. # # # # # #
I feel responsible for pointing out security issues to peers. # # # # # #
Software or hardware being certified means it is secure. # # # # # #
Former operators in management allow for more reasonable security-related business decisions. # # # # # #
Agility is more important than security. # # # # # #
The threat of bad press after a security incident is what companies fear most. # # # # # #
Table 6: To what extent would you agree with the following statements?
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